Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence
OUTLINE
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
太原市牛奶生产经营管理办法（2001年修正）
山西省太原市人大常委会
太原市牛奶生产经营管理办法（2001年修正）
１９９６年６月２８日太原市第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第三十三次会议通过 １９９６年８月１日山西省第八届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十三次会议批准 根据２００１年７月２９日山西省第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十四次会议批准的２００１年６月２７日太原市第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第三十二次会议关于修改《太原市牛奶生产经营管理办法》的决定修正
第一章 总 则
第一条 为了加强牛奶生产经营活动的管理，促进牛奶生产发展，满足人民生活的需要，维护牛奶消费者、生产者和经营者的合法权益，根据国家有关法律和法规，结合本市实际，指定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称牛奶，是指生鲜奶和以生鲜奶为原料加工制作的消毒奶（巴氏杀菌乳）、灭菌奶、酸奶及营养奶。
第三条 凡在本市行政区域内从事牛奶的生产、加工、销售及监督管理的单位和个人，都必须遵守本办法。
第四条 市、县（市、区）人民政府应将牛奶生产纳入国民经济发展计划，鼓励和扶持国有企业、集体企业、其他企业和个体养殖户发展牛奶生产，保证牛奶质量，满足市场供给。
第五条 市、县（市、区）畜牧行政主管部门主管牛奶生产经营活动的管理工作。
市、县（市、区）工商、卫生、物价、质量技术监督等行政管理部门在各自的职责范围内，负责有关的牛奶生产经营活动的监督管理工作。
第二章 生产管理
第六条 市、县（市、区）人民政府应逐步增加奶牛业生产投入，重点用于牛奶生产性保护，、基础设施建设、新品种开发与引进、新技术研究与推广应用。
第七条 县（市、区）畜牧行政主管部门应当对奶牛登记造册，以场或村建立奶牛登记卡，组织和引导饲养单位和个人按照市场经济规律，发展奶牛业生产。
奶牛饲养单位和个人，应对奶牛逐一建立档案，合理配置牛群结构，实施科学选种、饲养，牛群质量。
第八条 奶牛的更新处理，须报县级以上畜牧行政主管部门备案。县级以上人民政府投资或补贴的奶牛饲养场（户）更新处理奶牛，应通过该级畜牧行政主管部门批准并办理有关手续。
从外地（市）引进奶牛或销往外地（市）奶牛，须经市动物防疫监督机构检验合格后方可运进或运出。
第九条 奶牛场应符合动物检验要求，牛舍整洁通风，有与牛群相适应的室外活动场所，定期清扫消毒。
第十条 养殖规模在１０头以上的奶牛场，应配备动物防疫专职人员，定期对奶牛进行防疫检查和防治工作，并接受动物防疫监督机构的监督检查；其他奶牛养殖场（户）须接受当地动物防疫监督机构对奶牛进行疫病检查和防治。
第十一条 动物防疫监督机构应当定期对奶牛场（户）进行严格的奶牛布氏杆菌病、结核病和其他疫病检查，符合动物防疫条件的发给《动物防疫合格证》，奶牛养殖场（户）凭证到牛奶加工单位售奶。
第十二条 经动物防疫监督机构检查出患有布氏杆菌病、结核病和其他人畜共患传染病的奶牛，由市畜牧行政主管部门组织隔离净化饲养或无害化处理。
当发现奶牛传染病疫情蔓延时，市畜牧行政主管部门应当化定奶牛疫病控制区或隔离区，并采取紧急防治或处理措施。
第十三条 牛奶生产场（户）应严格执行挤奶程序，防止牛奶污染。成母牛在２０都以上的奶牛场（户），应当实行机械化挤奶。挤奶人员须持有卫生行政部门核发的身体健康证，定期进行身体检查，患有传染病者不得挤奶。盛奶容器必须无毒、无害、保持清洁。
第十四条 牛奶生产场（户）和收购单位应当及时将生鲜牛奶冷却至４℃以下，贮存期间牛奶温度应当保持在７℃以下；没有冷却设备的应在２小时内将生鲜牛奶送到牛奶加工单位。
第十五条 禁止出售下列牛奶：
（一）患结核病、布氏杆菌病及其他传染病的牛产的奶；
（二）患有腺炎的牛和乳房创伤的牛产的奶；
（三）产犊后７天的初奶；
（四）应用抗生素类药物的牛用药期间和停药５天内产的奶；
（五）变质奶、过期奶、污染奶和掺杂掺假奶。
第三章 加工管理
第十六条 牛奶加工单位必须具备下列条件：
（一）厂房（车间）建设布局合理，符合食品卫生要求；
（二）有与生产规模相适应的冷却、冷藏设施、辅助设备和清洗、卫生、消毒系统；
（三）有鲜奶包装生产线；
（四）有卫生、计量、质量检验机构或人员、检验设备和检验制度，检验人员须培训合格，持证上岗。
第十七条 新建、扩建、改建牛奶加工厂（车间），须经市畜牧行政主管部门和卫生行政部门审核同意，并办理有关建设项目审批手续。竣工后由卫生行政部门和畜牧行政主管部门验收合格，核发《卫生许可证》、《牛奶加工生产许可证》，并向工商行政管理部门登记注册后方可经营。
已建的牛奶加工厂（车间）不符合前款规定的，须补办有关手续后方可继续生产经营。
第十八条 加工单位收购生鲜牛奶，必须按照国家规定的质量和卫生标准严格检查验收。不得收购本办法第十五条规定禁止出售的牛奶，不得收购无《动物防疫合格证》的单位和个人销售的牛奶。
第十九条 加工单位必须严格执行牛奶出厂检验制度。牛奶的感官指标、理化指标、卫生指标必须符合国家标准。禁止卫生和质量不合格的牛奶出厂。
第二十条 上市牛奶的包装材料必须符合国家卫生标准，无毒无害；包装标识必须符合国家食品标签通用标准。
第二十一条 从事牛奶加工的生产人员须持有卫生行政部门核发的健康证，每年必须进行一次身体检查，凡不符合《中华人民共和国食品卫生法》要求的人员，应立即调离生产岗位。
第四章 销售管理
第二十二条 牛奶销售应按照定点定时，方便群众，多渠道经营的原则，合理布局销售网点。
第二十三条 牛奶销售亭（点）应悬挂市畜牧行政主管部门统一制作的牛奶销售标志，明码标价，亮证经营。
牛奶销售亭（点），应配备必要的冷藏设备，牛奶销售人员须持有卫生行政部门核发的健康证。
第二十四条 牛奶代售单位和个人应与加工生产厂家签定牛奶购销合同，信守签约，保证牛奶计量标准和质量标准。
第二十五条 禁止上市销售生奶、散装奶、无证加工的包装奶和本办法第十五条规定禁止出售的牛奶。
第二十六条 送奶车辆应保持清洁，严防运输过程中牛奶污染和变质。
第二十七条 销售牛奶应执行国家有关价格管理规定，不得随意提高价格。
第五章 罚 则
第二十八条 违反本办法规定，有下列行为之一的，由县级以上畜牧行政主管部门给予处罚：
（一）县级以上人民政府投资或补贴的奶牛饲养场（户）未经批准更新处理奶牛的，追回投资或补贴款额，并处奶牛价值百分之十的罚款；
（二）奶牛场不符合动物防疫条件的责令改正，在规定的期限内不改正的可以吊销《动物防疫合格证》；
（三）不领取《牛奶加工生产许可证》加工牛奶的，责令其停止加工、销售，并处以非法所得二至三倍的罚款；
（四）无市畜牧行政主管部门统一制作的牛奶销售标志售奶的，责令其停止销售，并处以５００元以下罚款；
（五）销售生奶、散装奶、无证加工包装奶的，没收非法所得和剩余奶，并处以５００元以上１０００元以下罚款。
第二十九条 不领取《卫生许可证》、《营业执照》加工牛奶的，由卫生行政部门、工商行政管理部门依法处理。
第三十条 使用有毒、有害材料包装牛奶的，由卫生行政部门依法处理；包装标识不符合国家食品标签通用标准的，由质量技术监督行政部门依法处理。
第三十一条 出售、收购本办法第十五条规定禁止出售的牛奶，牛奶加工单位使卫生和质量不合格的牛奶出厂的，由卫生行政部门、技术监督行政部门、工商行政管理部门依法处理。
第三十二条 生产、加工、销售不合格牛奶造成他人身体伤害的，应当承担民事责任；情节严重构成犯罪的，由司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第三十三条 消费者对违反本办法的行为，可以向有关部门举报。接到举报的部门应当及时予以处理。
第三十四条 牛奶生产经营单位和个人，对有关部门的监督检查和奶牛疫病防治应当予以配合，不得拒绝或阻挠，对阻挠执行公务违反《中华人民共和国治安处罚条例》的，由公安机关处理。
第三十五条 当事人对行政处罚不服的，可以在接到处罚通知之日起六十日内向作出处罚决定的机关的该级人民政府或上一级行政机关申请复议。当事人也可以直接向人民法院起诉。当事人逾期不申请复议、不起诉又不履行处罚决定的，由作出处罚决定的机关申请人民法院强制执行。
第三十六条 国家机关工作人员在牛奶生产经营活动的管理工作中滥用职权、徇私舞弊、玩忽职守的，由所在单位或主管机关给予行政处分；情节严重构成犯罪的，由司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第六章 附 则
第三十七条 本办法应用中的具体问题由太原市人民政府负责解释。
第三十八条 本办法经山西省人民代表大会常务委员会批准后公布施行。
太原市人大
２００１年７月２９日
